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Summary
The right of refusal to testify in civil proceedings
In the majority of civil cases the court has to establish the facts that will be
decisive for the outcome of the case. According to Dutch civil procedural law one of
the parties will be given the burden of proving the facts he stated to support his point
of view. In most cases the evidence brought forward will mainly or in part consist of
the depositions of witnesses, to be heard before the court dealing with the case.
Correspondingly, everyone who has been summoned to appear as a witness
has a legal obligation to present himself before the court, to take an oath and to give
testimony. A refusal to comply with one or more of these obligations can give rise to
criminal and civil liability and may engender coercive measures meant to compel the
witness to fulfil his obligations. Nevertheless, some witnesses has been attributed the
right to refuse to answer some or even all questions put to them, without having to
fear consequences of any sort.
This right of a witness to be excused from his obligations is usually referred to
as his v('rvi7wMi>y».vrt'c/i/, a term that has no English equivalent and can be described
as 'the right to refuse to testify". Next best is the term 'privilege', normally used to
designate the right of a person to refuse to disclose information, which right applies
in all kinds of situations, varying from being questioned as a witness to being subject
of a search warrant. For the sake of being concise this term will be used, noting that
the vcv.v<7)WH>)#vm /;/ that is meant is n<wrmver in the sense that it is restricted to the
situation in which the person concerned is heard as a witness before a court.
This study intends to give a full and systematic description of the circum-
stances in which in civil proceedings privileges can be invoked successfully. This
description is based on the study of the primary sources of law, i.e. legislation and
jurisprudence. The law in force is criticized in case of the occurrence of inconsisten-
cies, gaps and lack of clarity. Therefore, the actual situation has sometimes to be
studied as a function of the historical developments which led to the adopted inter-
pretation of the statutory articles concerning privileges. The results are compared
with the legislation of 13 other countries of continental Western Europe.
Chapter 2 focuses on the origin and application of the first articles in which
the professional privilege was codified, to wit s. 1946 of the Civil Code and s. 189 of
the Code of Criminal Proceedings, both of 1838. The latter article was literally cop-
ied from the first. This focus is imposed by the fact that the actual interpretation - the
outcome of a development set by a Supreme Court decision in 1913 - has very little
affinity with the literal meaning of the articles in force (s. 165 Code of Civil Proceed-
ings, s. 218 Code of Criminal Proceedings), which differ only on minor points from
their 19th century ancestors. Thus legal history is taken as the starting point for a
systematic description of privileges.
First it is noted that the available material gives no indication of the meaning
that the then legislator attributed to the said articles. This seems a bit surprising, as
both articles were new in a sense that they were not derived from rules of law which
were in force before 1838. Even the drafts of the codes mentioned showed articles
that largely ditiered from the eventually adopted text. On the other hand, their mean-
ing is clear and could be taken at its face value. Several arguments which could be
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construed in favour of a not literal interpretation have to be rejected as lacking an
empirical basis or as being highly improbable. This results in the hypothesis that the
intended meaning of the articles is tantamount to the literal meaning of the text,
which is referred to as the Je/äi/// V/VM\ The only scholar of that period who takes
another position (J. de Bosch Kemper) is only able to do so by deliberately miscon-
struing the history of the legislation process and by postulating an interpretation that
is not warranted by any valid reason.
By means of an analysis of all 19th century legal incidents that can be associ-
ated with the professional privilege, it is shown that the </e/J«//r VICH- was actually the
rtw/m/ VMTV, even within the circles of Supreme Court justices. At the same time
developments in criminal policy that asked for judicial authorities with effective
powers make it clear that the receive«/ view could hamper these authorities in their
working in a way that could be considered as undesirable.
Anyhow, legal debate in the beginning of the 20th century (especially the
1905 meeting of the Association of Dutch Lawyers) shows that legal theory is gradu-
ally tending to a position which facilitates a narrower interpretation of the articles
concerning the professional privilege. The first time the Supreme Court is called to
give a judgment on this point (in 1913), it chooses a narrow interpretation, exactly
the interpretation which has in fact been advocated by De Bosch Kemper nearly a
century earlier (Liefdehuisarrest). According to this interpretation the professional
privilege is restricted to those professionals who are bound by a pledge of profes-
sional secrecy, whose help is sought for by their clients and who can only adequately
perform their duties when secrecy can be guaranteed under all circumstances. Later
jurisprudence remained faithful to the then formulated principles.
This restrictive interpretation leaves open for question in which way all other
pledges of secrecy must be dealt with. This explains why the privileges in general are
largely determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which resorted to a rather
complicated, more or less layered system in an attempt to cover all possibilities in an
acceptable way..
Chapter 3 starts with an overview of the outcome of jurisprudential and legis-
lative activities until now. This overview provides a structure in which all privileges
and related rights can be fitted.
Firstly the privilege for relatives has to be distinguished. Since 1838 it has
always been part of the by law accorded privileges and it underwent very few
changes since. It can be studied seperately from the other privileges. The same ap-
plies to the wewo /<?«£»/«r privilege, which has only since 1988 been provided for by
civil law.
The professional privilege is largely jurisprudential as a result of the devel-
opments described in chapter 2. Moreover, the Supreme Court proclaimed it in 1985
as a principle of Dutch law with a general scope, thus having implications for all pro-
cedures and situations in which information has to be obtained from professionals
who have the right to invoke this privilege. As to be expected from these conse-
quences, only a limited number of professions enjoys this privilege. This is compen-
sated for by a new privilege created by the Supreme Court. In this book this privilege
is coined after the first judgment in which it is mentioned ( / / < w FÜ/M//)' privilege).
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In the course of the years the legislator has taken several explicit or more or
less implicit measures to secure the secrecy of specific information. The persons con-
cerned (in most cases civil servants) are bound by a pledge of secrecy and are some-
times exempted from certain obligations to reveal that information to others. The
Supreme Court approach excludes them from the professional privilege. A case to
case study is therefore necessary to decide whether a particular pledge of secrecy
implies a privilege. If so, this is referred to as a /ex i/?ma/w privilege.
As these categories leave a number of cases in which the claim of secrecy is
by all means reasonable, but still not covered, the Supreme Court indicated that the
court could always, if it deems necessary to do so, make use of its power to prevent
the answering of specific questions put to a witness. This is referred to as the inciden-
tal privilege.
The rest of the chapter forms the core of the book and concerns the detailed
description of each of these categories. In each case the ratio of the privilege is de-
scribed, as well as its relation to the other privileges, its scope, its legal character, the
persons concerned and the accepted exceptions.
The description of the privilege for relatives (provided for in s. 165 ss. 2a
Code of Civil Proceedings) concentrates in the first place on a detailed analysis of
parts of family law. Recent changes in family law have complicated the question
whether there is kinship to a certain degree between two persons. To cover ail com-
plications orten an analysis of the history of a particular statute is unavoidable. Even-
tually a conclusion can be reached on all issues that arise.
In the second place it turns out to be inevitable to study the legal concept of a
'party' involved in legal proceedings, since the privilege of relatives is attributed to
persons who are family of a party. This notion is analysed with the help of older ju-
risprudence on similar questions. It is found that especially the identification of per-
sons in charge with the moral person for which they are employed, leads in some
cases to an unjustifiable outcome.
The interpretation of the exceptions to this privilege (s. 284 ss. 3 Code of
Civil Proceedings) turns out to be cumbersome. The history of these exceptions is
traced from the outset and shows an almost diabolical succession of misunderstand-
ings and legislative carelessness. A sensible interpretation of this article therefore has
to be based on an analysis of the problem concerned as a whole and cannot be de-
rived from the remarks the legislator made in the course of events.
The Supreme Court created an exception in case the witness is a party to the
legal proceedings himself. This decision turns out to be based on a misreading of the
preparatory proceedings of the law in question and cannot be endorsed by any rea-
sonable argument.
The Ht'wo fcvKVMr privilege gives rise to similar questions as the privilege for
relatives, since s. 165 ss. 3 Code of Civil Proceedings uses the same wordings as s.
165 ss. 2a of the same Code. Most interesting in this case is the scope of the privi-
lege, since the legislator chose to restrict this to crimes, excluding misdemeanours. It
appears that the reasoning followed cannot be upheld in the light of other regulations.
Nevertheless, the wordings of the law exclude a jurisprudential solution.
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This privilege has been extended to cases that are not covered by the wordings
of the law, especially to bankruptcy hearings. The Supreme Court argued that in that
case the loophole in the legal articles should be filled by referring to the civil coun-
terpart of this privilege and not the criminal counterpart. It is shown that this view is
historically and materially incorrect.
The professional privilege is in most cases the only privilege that is studied in
more detail. The cause can be found in the jurisprudential turn the Supreme Court
took in 1913 by giving an interpretation that could not be justified by the wordings,
legal history or thitherto application of the article. This jurisprudential turn made the
relation between the pledge of professional secrecy and the professional privilege
especially problematic. It is argued that the only solution can be found in separating
these categories completely in a sense that mere is no legal relevant relation between
them. Invoking or not the privilege does not affect the question whether or not the
pledge of professional secrecy can be violated, neither can the existence of a pledge
of professional secrecy be decisive for the question if the privilege exists or can be
invoked. It is shown that a logically sound system results which can account for the
outcome of the decisions of the Supreme Court, although admittedly the Supreme
Court itself is not always consistent in its distinctions. In this system the waiver of
secrecy by the client, which does not affect the professional privilege, can be ex-
plained without any problem.
The overview of the professionals concerned starts with a rather new approach
in distinguishing four circles of professional assistance that emerge from the corpse
of legal decisions and can be associated with the principles formulated by the Su-
preme Court in the Liefdehuis- and Notaris-Maas-judgments (legal, (para(medical,
spiritual-social and notarial circle). Using this concept most decisions can be ac-
counted for, whereas in some cases doubts have to be casted as to their correctness.
The chosen approach has the merit of allowing a coherent overview. Special attention
is given to the assistants of the professionals concerned, who enjoy a </w/V«/ privi-
lege.
Since the professional privilege is associated with a certain profession, the law
limits the existence of the privilege to professional activities of the persons con-
cerned. Jurisprudence on this issue is related to the character of the specific activity
and needs therefore to be described for each of the circles of professional assistance
separately. The scope of the privilege depends in a similar way on the charachter of
the profession concerned. Lawyers and notaries additionally have to take in account
the elaborated exceptions that were made up by the Supreme Court in case they as-
sisted at negotiations preceding a contract. A category of exceptions for all circles,
occurring in what the Supreme Court indicates as 'very exceptional circumstances',
has no practical meaning in civil cases.
According to recent Supreme Court decisions the professional witness who is
a party to the legal proceedings himself, keeps the right to invoke his professional
Privilege. The problem is studied in more detail and although in general the Supreme
Courts decision gives a satisfactory result, an approach taking heed of the procedural
obligations of a party, would have given a fairer outcome.
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The study of the /ex spec«//« privilege pretends to be exhaustive in a sense
that all relevant statutory pledges of secrecy are taken into account. They are ordered
into groups depending on their wording, intention and content. In this way some gen-
eral conclusions can be drawn as to whether or not these pledges of secrecy imply a
privilege. However, legislatory gaps pop up everywhere, leaving an image of disor-
der and arbitrariness.
The paragraph is extended to articles that could arguably be associated with
some sort of privilege. At the end the position of the constitutional King is analysed,
leading to the conclusion that he is exempted from the duty to be a witness as a con-
sequence of his constitutional position.
The //a/3/jy Fo/n/7y privilege hitherto has found only one instance in which the
person concerned could invoke the privilege, i.e. a doctor at an advice centre in con-
nection with the identity of the persons who brought something to his attention. This
instance is extended to some other cases that could arguably meet the criteria set by
the Supreme Court. Since there is very little literature and jurisprudence, legal theory
on this subject has still a summary character.
The /m/V/tvi/«/ privilege has in the first place to be construed as a right and not
as a favour given by the court. This is the only way the Supreme Court decisions can
be interpreted, since it indicated that along this line problems can be met that concern
Ihe pledge of secrecy and similar interests of poJice agents, secret services and scien-
tific researchers.
The distinguishing feature in relation to the other privileges is the fact that in
these cases the judge has to take in account all circumstances of the case, which are
relevant for his final decision. The witness has to justify why he is entitled to remain
silent, whereas the parties can put forward everything that sheds another light on the
claims of the witness. In all other cases the circumstances of the case do not play any
role; if the criteria for invoking the privilege are met, the judge is obliged to allow the
witness to ignore the question(s) posed.
Rather surprisingly the privilege of the press has to be construed as an inci-
dental privilege too. Their privilege can only be accepted if the balance between the
interest of finding the truth and the interest of protecting their sources tips in their
favour. That depends on the actual interests at stake and cannot be decided in ad-
vance for all cases. Ihe same applies to police officers.
The last paragraph of chapter 3 gives an overview of all procedures in which
the rules governing standard civil procedures with regard to privileges have to be
applied. In most cases this is clear, in some cases not. Among the latter are the sum-
mary proceedings of s. 254 Code of Civil Proceedings. In respect of former changes
of the law the conclusion is drawn that the privileges described in this book have to
be respected in these summary proceedings as well.
Chapter 4 bears upon the procedural implications of the privileges described.
These implications are described in a more or less chronological order, starting with
the information to be supplied by the court before hearing the witness.
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The straightforwardness of this approach, relying on the hitherto correct as-
sumption that the privilege can only be invoked in court, is disturbed by a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court, in which the witness was given the right io put tor-
ward his arguments in favour of his privilege in writing before the actual hearing.
The judgment is discussed in detail, resulting in the conclusion that it is not in accor-
dance with existing law and jurisprudence and needs therefore to be treated as excep-
tional if not erroneous.
Some clear guidelines are set for the judge hearing a witness. These guidelines
are derived from the actual legislation and the principle that the rights of witnesses
should be respected by the courts, that therefore should abstain from any action that
would amount to taking advantage of the ignorance of the witness.
The Dutch legislator always neglected the status of decisions made during
hearings, and this affects the decisions made in response to the claim of a privilege as
well. The various aspects of those decisions (content, formalities, formulation, the act
of its rendering) are dealt with in a systematic way. The existing confusion with re-
gard to legal remedies is only partly solved by the Supreme Court. Solutions are pro-
posed for the remaining lacunas.
The admissibility of evidence when a privilege is involved had been subject of
various, but not very congruous decisions. The different aspects of this question are
analyzed and solved.
The last paragraph concerns the complications that arise when parties stay
anonymous. Jurisprudence has not reached a final point yet, but taking the ratio of
the privilege as a starting point it can be argued that a claim to this privilege has to be
accepted if the witness establishes a probability of the required relation between him
and the anonymous party.
Chapter 5 compares the Dutch law concerning privileges with the legislation
(as interpreted by some leading cases if necessary) of the other countries of continen-
tal Western Europe. The common law countries are excluded, because only choices
made by the national legislator are the object of comparison. The same counts for
Switzerland, where the law of civil proceedings is a matter of cantonal interest.
The comparison is made by taking some topics that concern the means chosen
by the legislator, the scope of the privileges and some problems that specifically oc-
cupied the legal debate in the Netherlands. The comparison shows that most legisla-
tors are more concerned with giving explicit rules than the Dutch and chose
techniques which are perfectly suited to avoid the rigidness so often associated with
fixed rules. As far as the scope of privileges is concerned, the Netherlands in most
cases have taken resort to a rather frugal approach, thus showing little comprehension
for the moral and professional dilemmas standing as a witness could bring along.
Chapter 6 concludes that the Dutch legislator should be more active and pre-
cise in this field and should try to establish a general statute on the hearing of wit-
nesses. A list is made of problems that should be covered and in the preceding
chapters some more concrete proposals can be found. The system adopted by the
Danish legislator is recommended as an example. The Danish law gives some free-
dom to the judge in certain areas, but defines clearly in which cases no privilege can
be invoked and in which cases it can be invoked without any restriction. This tech-
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nique can be used to set clear guidelines which avoid rigidness and nevertheless al-
low to make choices which should be the concern of the legislator.
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